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The figures are staggering. 
Their size raises the question whether, in their quest to appear tough on the banks, 
governments and regulators have not produced a blunt weapon which amounts to a form 
of general taxation: 
1. The effect of these massive fines and compensation penalties has not been to reduce 
the returns to the banks’ owners or senior employees. No major bank has announced 
that it will be unable to pay dividends or bonuses until it has made good the losses 
caused by these payments. Instead, the costs of meeting the penalties are passed on to 
the public in higher bank charges and fees. 
2. Some of the compensation schemes (in the UK, at least) take the approach of paying 
out to all those who bought a demonised product, without the need to show loss in the 
way that a legal claim would require. For example, claims for the mis-selling of 
endowment policies linked to mortgage loans, did not take account of the fact that the 
returns on the investment, which were much lower than had been promised, represented 
one side of the coin. The other side was that the cost of the mortgage loan was also 
much lower than had been anticipated, as a result of the same environment of low 
interest rates. In many cases, the borrower/policyholder was pretty much in the same 
position at the end of the mortgage/policy period as he would have been in, had the 
investment returns been as predicted. The criticism that can properly be levelled is that 
most borrowers were unaware of this. They did not know, as they took the benefit of the 
low interest payments, that they would need to pay for it at the end of the term. The 
banks can perhaps be blamed for not explaining this. So can the then government, 
which claimed credit for holding mortgage rates at record low levels, without explain 
that the cost of this would need to be met on repayment day. 
The compensation scheme has, arguably, over-compensated the borrowers concerned: 
they benefited from low interest rates for years, and were then compensated for low 
investment returns at the end of the period. 
The effect of both of these processes has been to pass on to the consumer (the taxpayer 
in a different hat) the cost of making huge payments, either to those consumers deemed 
unfairly treated, or to the public purse, in the shape of fines and penalties. 
The only merit in the process is that the tax is progressive. The greatest cost is borne by 
the customers who did not receive any compensation, perhaps because they were not 
misled into buying the products in the first place. This group  probably consists of the 
section of the population that is the most financially sophisticated, and affluent. 
 
